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ABSTRACT 
On 15th December 2015, Timothy Peake – the 4th ESA astronaut in 20 months – headed into orbit for a 
6-month stay on the ISS. The British astronaut's “Principia” mission holds many interesting tasks, not only 
for Tim Peake himself (he performed an EVA on 15th January 2016) but also for the teams on the ground. 
One of the most exciting activities was the second session of the Airway Monitoring experiment, which 
again included an experiment run in the US airlock under coordination of the Columbus Control Centre 
(Col-CC). Besides that, there were many other experiments, such as EML, PK4, DOSIS and Meteron, and 
also the transition to new NASA tools (e.g. WebAD) was done in this period. Since the establishment of 
ESA's new setup in July 2015, Col-CC has been working together with all its partners to define the new 
interfaces, exploit new possibilities, and define in detail the tasks for the operations teams. Besides the 
ongoing work to monitor and command Columbus, support the ESA experiments on the ISS, as well as 
supporting the ESA astronaut himself, Col-CC is looking forward towards potential future tasks and 
challenges. Based on many years of experience in human space flight, an initial study was launched to 
investigate some of the challenges of human space flight activities beyond Earth orbit. 
 
One of these challenges is the delay of communication transmissions experienced over long distances. 
Until now, all our human space flight operations have been based on (near) real-time communications to 
monitor and control the spacecraft. This paper describes the results of our study investigating the 
necessary changes to current operations in the case of long-distance communications. Example 
procedures are assessed on their reliance on real-time communications and thus how current operations 
would be impacted by transmission delays. Methods are proposed to make the procedures tolerant to 
delays, and enable operations to use these procedures for deep space missions. 
 
Introduction 
The “Principia” mission of Timothy Peake started in 
December 2015 and was the final event in the row 
of ESA astronauts in the years 2014 to 2016. 
Starting with the German ESA astronaut, 
Alexander Gerst in May 2014, the almost 
continuous stay of ESA astronauts on-board ISS 
was continued by Samantha Cristoforetti in 
December 2014 and Andreas Mogensen in 
September 2015. While the “Principia” mission has 
just ended in June 2016, the next mission with  
 
Thomas Pesquet is already approaching and will 
start in December 2016. 
Based on the long experience of DLR’s German 
Space Operations Centre(GSOC) in manned 
space operations, in 2005 the Eneide Mission and 
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in 2006 the support of the Astrolab mission with 
Thomas Reiter (see [1] and [2]) could be 
performed successfully. The Interim Utilization 
Phase was done in parallel to setting up Col-CC 
([3] to [5]) for the later Columbus operations. Since 
February 2008, when Col-CC started its Columbus 
operations (see [6] to [14] and [13] to [14]), all 
further missions and increments have been 
prepared and supported successfully. Also, the 
new setup with split responsibilities among several 
services and new interfaces resulted in more 
efficient operations of Columbus and the payloads. 
With this experience, it will allow operating 
Columbus until at least 2024, assuming that the 
boundary conditions will not change (see [12]). 
In parallel to the standard operations tasks, the 
Col-CC Flight Control Team (FCT) is looking 
towards the future and is conducting preliminary 
investigations on selected aspects of future deep 
space missions. In the study [15], modifications to 
operations have been analysed when boundary 
conditions change from (near) real-time to long-
distance communications. The focus was put on 
quantifying the effect of the signal propagation 
delay on procedure execution. 
European Astronauts on ISS 
Having the fourth ESA astronaut in a short 
timeframe on-board ISS was one of the main driver 
of Increment 45/46. Timothy Peake started his 
“PRINCIPIA” mission on 15 December 2015 
launching from Baikonur in Kazakhstan together 
with Roscosmos cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko and 
NASA astronaut Tim Kopra. After four orbits, the 
Soyuz capsule docked to the ISS and the three 
crewmates could enter the ISS on the same day 
(see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1: Tim Peake arrives at the ISS (Photo: NASA) 
Already four weeks after his arrival at the ISS, ESA 
astronaut Tim Peake performed his first EVA and 
worked outside the ISS together with Tim Kopra 
(see Fig. 2). He performed the EVA on 15 January 
2016 replacing a failed power regulator and 
installing some cabling. The EVA was shortened 
due to problems with Tim Kopra’s EVA suit. 
 
Fig. 2: Tim Peake during his EVA  
(Photo: NASA) 
Among many other experiments, Tim Peake 
performed the Airway Monitoring experiment in the 
US Airlock under reduced pressure together with 
Tim Kopra. The scientific goal of ESA’s Airway 
Monitoring experiment is to investigate how space 
flight affects lung health by measuring exhaled 
nitric oxide (NO) levels as evidence of airway 
inflammation. Previous research indicates that 
humans in space are prone to airway inflammation 
due to the increased risk of inhalation of dust and 
other free-floating particles as described in [14].  
After preparing the experimental setup in the US 
Airlock, Tim Peake and Tim Kopra performed the 
experiment under reduced atmospheric pressure 
on 25 February 2016 (see Fig. 3). Thanks to the 
lessons learned which have been implemented 
since the last session in 2015, the experiment 
could be performed very smoothly. 
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Fig. 3: Tim Peake performing the Airway 
Monitoring experiment in the Airlock  
(Photo: NASA) 
Tim Peake returned to Earth with Soyuz 45S on 
18 June 2016 with cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko 
and astronaut Tim Kopra after working on-board 
the ISS during Increments 46 and 47. 
New Interfaces, new Tools and  
Standard Operations 
In [13], the new operations setup implemented in 
January 2014 is described. Meanwhile this setup 
has been fully implemented and experience during 
three ESA long-term missions has been gained.  
The infrastructure upgrade of the Col-CC Ground 
Segment has been finalized in the last year. The 
virtualization of server hardware was mostly done 
by the Col-CC Ground segment team and offers on 
the one side improvement of server handling and 
associated hardware and on the other side makes 
control room swaps easier than before. Details on 
the virtualization at Col-CC can be found in [16] 
and [17].  
In Spring 2016, the first commissioning phase of 
the new on-board Solid State Drives (SSD) was 
performed. The first tests show good performance 
of the new subsystem which will improve the 
handling of large on-board recorded video files. 
Also in 2014, NASA started to introduce a new 
planning suite called OPTIMIS, consisting of 
SCORE, WebAD and Viewer. The implementation 
of SCORE and Viewer is described in [14]. After 
the start of the operational use of Viewer, in 
September 2015 the change from the ESA tool 
OPDCS (Operations Planning Data Collection 
System) to the NASA tool WebAD (Web Activity 
Dictionary) took place. The advantage of the 
transition to WebAD is that the ESA team will use 
the whole NASA planning suite instead of an ESA 
stand-alone solution. This allows the use of a 
unified and integrated system with a strong 
backing in development. In [14], the planned 
transition schedule in the timeframe until 
September 2016 described the new system to be 
ready for operational usage in increment 49/50. 
Because of some problems with the OPDCS end 
of 2015, the transition schedule has been 
advanced by 6 months to December 2015. As the 
teams have been trained for WebAD until then, it 
was possible to substitute OPDCS by WebAD 
already at the start of Increment 47/48. Hence, a 
transition procedure was developed and some 
tests were performed in the next weeks to ensure a 
smooth transition in early 2016. In January 2016, 
the OPDCS database was frozen for some days 
and the whole database content of the OPDCS 
was transferred to WebAD and cross-checked for 
transfer flaws. After confirmation of a good 
transition of the data to the new tool, WebAD has 
been used in operations by the ESA team from the 
start of Increment 47/48 onwards. On the 
operations side, OPDCS was retired a few weeks 
afterwards, when the new tool was judged fully 
reliable for operations. 
In addition to the scheduled updates, the 
Columbus FCT has to deal with unplanned on-
board events. In July 2016, one of the CWSA 
(Columbus Water Separator Assembly) went off 
and a switch-over to the second unit had to be 
performed. Meanwhile, the first unit is up again but 
it is intended to replace it by a new unit, which will 
be delivered by the end of 2016.  
Investigations on Operations in Deep Space 
One major challenge of manned deep-space flight 
is the communication signal delay experienced 
over long distances. Until today, all human space 
flight operations have been based on real-time 
communications to monitor and control spacecraft. 
In the future, missions well beyond Earth’s vicinity 
are anticipated, which will result in the need for 
delay-tolerant operations. 
So far, only robotic missions have been conducted 
in deep space with significant delays in 
communications, while all manned missions were 
close to Earth. For the communications delay, the 
One Way Light Time (OWLT) is an appropriate 
measure. Table 1 provides an exemplary overview 
of the approximate maximum OWLT of various 
missions during their farthest point from Earth. 
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Tab. 1: OWLT of various missions 
Destination Mission OWLT
LEO ISS, via GSO relay 
satellites (manned) 
< 0.3 s 
Moon Apollo 11 (manned) 1.3 s 
L2 (Earth-Sun) Gaia 5.0 s 
2000 SG344 proposed (manned) 
NEO mission [18] 
11.9 s 
Mars Mars Science 
Laboratory 
22.3 min [19] 
Europa Galileo 52.1 min [20] 
Pluto New Horizons 4.4 h 
Space operations heavily rely on validated ground 
and flight procedures. For Columbus and ISS in 
general, all activities and commanding are 
planned, prepared and coordinated days and 
weeks in advance; this also includes preparing for 
numerous contingency situations (for which 
analysis and recovery actions are pre-defined). 
The study examines the impact of communication 
delays on the existing procedures that are being 
used for commanding by flight controllers in day-to-
day Columbus operations. 
 
Procedures for Columbus Operations 
The Columbus procedures, known as Operations 
Data File (ODFs), exist for a range of tasks and 
situations, including:  
• Columbus activation & checkout as well as 
module safing & deactivation 
• maintenance (both preventive and corrective)  
• activation, operation, deactivation and reconfi-
guration of both systems and payloads 
• contingency, emergency, off-nominal operation 
Most commonly, checklist procedures are used for 
daily operations, which are textual and list step-by-
step instruction sets. Each procedure step has a 
sequential number and a title and contains one or 
more atomic instructions in a standardized format. 
It may be divided into several smaller steps with 
each sub-step having a number and title, too (see 
Fig. 4). Procedure steps may contain additional 
notes, caution and warning blocks to provide 
further background information or indicate where 
special care is required. Off-nominal blocks 
prescribe pre-defined reactions for some 
contingency situations that may arise during 
execution of a procedure.  
 
Fig. 4: (Redacted) first steps of a procedure used 
in Col‑CC ground operations. 
As shown in Fig. 4, when a procedure step can be 
executed by both crew and ground, it typically lists 
the unshaded crew instructions followed by the 
equivalent ground instructions in the shaded block. 
Ground operators are familiar with both the crew 
instructions and the ground language and thus can 
follow along all instructions of a procedure.  
Whenever possible, steps are performed by 
ground commanding to preserve crew time as 
much as possible. 
There are, however, procedures that consist of 
combined crew and ground steps. An example is 
the installation of new hardware including its initial 
activation, where the Columbus power outlets are 
being commanded by ground to save the crew time 
required for handling of these steps. In these 
procedures, frequent synchronization points 
between crew and ground are driving the 
proceeding between steps. These points of 
synchronization are explicit voice call-outs by the 
ground resp. a crew member contacting the 
responsible control centre, who then has to wait for 
a reply by the ground before being allowed to 
continue with the execution of the procedure. 
For crew call-outs, this is mostly codified as an 
«On COL CC GO» (read: ask COL CC if ready to 
proceed) or «✔ COL-CC on […]» (read: check with 
COL CC that […]) instruction. These calls are 
generally used to synchronize execution of the 
current procedure with the ground, e.g. to make 
sure a set of ground-only instructions have been 
successfully completed, or to consult with the 
ground on how to handle off-nominal situations, 
e.g. above-threshold smoke detector sensor 
values. 
Naturally, the on-board crew-only procedures and 
steps are not affected by an increased latency in 
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communications. However, for the mentioned 
synchronization points as well as for ground-only 
procedures, delays pose a significant impact. 
Reaching a critical system state during operations 
should be avoided at all times. Due to the way the 
systems on-board the station are designed, 
entering a transient critical state cannot be avoided 
during the execution of some procedures. 
In general, a critical state is reached when systems 
are activated but the automatic, continuous checks 
for operational limits by the on-board Data 
Management System are not (yet).  
For example, in a procedure for activating a 
payload rack (International Standard Payload 
Rack, ISPR), the power to the ISPR is switched on 
a couple of steps before the internal smoke 
detectors are activated. This leaves a timeframe 
within which a locally confined fire can stay 
undetected. Such a situation is especially critical 
when the execution of a procedure is halted 
between entering and exiting the critical state, i.e. 
in this example between activating the power and 
switching on the smoke detectors. This is one of 
the reasons why system safing and rolling back 
procedures step-by-step is important when their 
execution has been aborted. 
 
Impact of signal propagation delay 
Real-time execution of activities for space systems 
is governed by the time a signal takes to travel 
from its source to a destination. The OWLT is a 
measure of distance normalized to the speed of 
light and quantifies this time in the optimal 
condition, i.e. when the signal travels at full light 
speed.  
For example, a telemetry packet sent by a probe 
on the lunar surface takes about 1.2 to 1.3 
seconds to reach a ground station on Earth, 
assuming a direct path of communication. To send 
a command to the probe and receive changing 
telemetry values as a result of this command thus 
takes at least 2.4 seconds.  
Such a send-receive or write-read cycle is called a 
round-trip: A packet is sent from the ground station 
and arrives at the probe, then a resulting telemetry 
packet travels all the way back from the probe to 
the ground station. The duration of the round-trip is 
(at least) two times the OWLT. 
The procedure steps used in Col-CC operations 
generally follow a read-write-read pattern, i.e. 
certain telemetry values are verified to be at an 
expected value resp. within an accepted range, 
then a command is sent and the resulting change 
of state verified via telemetry again. This three-step 
process is repeated within the procedure multiple 
times for all equipment of concern to the 
associated activity. The execution of procedures 
thus requires multiple full round-trips of 
communication, one for each write-read group of 
instructions that may be clustered into one or more 
procedure steps. However, procedures often 
contain multiple successive read-only steps, which 
do not require a round-trip to be executed one after 
another, and a varying number of steps with one or 
more commands.  
It follows that the number of round-trips does not 
correlate with the number of steps in a procedure 
and they are therefore not a good indicator for the 
impact of the signal propagation time. 
 
Characteristics of procedure/time criticality 
To assess the criticality of a procedure based on 
its steps, basic characteristics can be defined: 
• ݊௦௧௘௣௦,௧௢௧௔௟ – total number of steps in a 
procedure 
Rule: Add up the number of steps in the 
procedure. If a procedure step is split into sub-
steps, count the number of sub-steps instead. 
• ݊௦௧௘௣௦,௖௥௜௧. – number of steps while in critical 
state 
Rule: Similar to the total number of steps, but just 
counting the steps between entering and leaving a 
critical system state, inclusive of the steps where 
this state is entered resp. left. 
As outlined before, some steps (incl. sub-steps) in 
procedures contain multiple read-write groups of 
instructions, while many others only contain read 
instructions. As such, the steps as currently 
defined in procedures do not provide the 
necessary granularity to measure the amount of 
round-trips and must thus be decomposed into 
individual instructions. These instructions are then 
regrouped into sets of instructions that can be 
executed in one block without the need for a full 
round-trip.  
Hence, the following mentions of “sets” refer to a 
group of continuous read instructions that may be 
followed by one or more write instructions, i.e. a 
set ends after a write instruction and before the 
following read instruction. Commonly, such an 
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instruction set consists of several Verify and/or 
Record instructions followed by one command.  
The general rule is that an instruction set contains 
consecutive instructions that are acted upon in 
quick succession without an intermediate waiting 
time induced by the data transmission to and from 
the spacecraft. Such a group of instructions is 
distinguished from a “procedure step”, which is a 
numbered and named step forming a group of 
logically or procedurally related instructions.  
As this study focusses on the activities in the 
control centre, explicit call-outs by the on-board 
crew to the ground are ignored when re-grouping 
instructions of a procedure. For completeness, 
these call-outs are instead measured by a 
dedicated characteristic. 
Characteristics of procedures that can be derived 
from decomposed procedures: 
• ݊௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧ – number of explicit synchro-
nization points 
Rule: Add up the number of explicit call-outs to the 
station or ground, e.g. “ON Col-CC GO”. 
• ݊௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧ – number of implicit synchro-
nization points 
Rule: Count the number of consecutive read-write 
instruction groups and subtract one, resp. increase 
this number by one any time a command 
instruction (or set thereof) is followed by a Verify or 
Record instruction (ignoring explicit call-outs and 
“Record Command Time Stamp” instructions). 
• ݊௦௬௡௖,௧௢௧௔௟ – total number of synchronization 
points  
Rule: Sum of ݊௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧ and ݊௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧. 
Equal to the number of round-trips plus the number 
of coinciding implicit and explicit sync points. 
 
Impact factors 
Based on these characteristics, a number of 
impact factors can be derived. These are listed 
below and describe different kinds of procedure 
criticality: Either the share in critical steps or in 
(various types of) round-trips experienced during 
execution of a procedure. The latter factors enable 
measuring the impact the OWLT has on procedure 
execution in a quantitative way. All factors were 
chosen on the basis that a lower value indicates 
that a procedure carries less overall risk, thereby 
providing a simple and uniform way to indicate the 
quality of a procedure. 
• ݇௖௥௜௧.௦௧௘௣௦ ൌ ௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೎ೝ೔೟.௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೟೚೟ೌ೗ 
Ratio of procedure steps while in critical state to 
total number of procedure steps, ranging from zero 
(best) to one (worst case, i.e. all procedure steps 
are critical). 
• ݇௦௬௡௖ ൌ ௡ೞ೤೙೎,೟೚೟ೌ೗௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೟೚೟ೌ೗ 
Ratio of total number of synchronization points to 
total number of procedure steps (lower means less 
OWLT-dependence). 
• ݇௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧ ൌ ௡ೞ೤೙೎,೐ೣ೛೗೔೎೔೟௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೟೚೟ೌ೗  
Ratio of number of explicit synchronization points 
to total number of procedure steps (a value of zero 
means no explicit calls to the ground are made). 
• ݇௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧ ൌ ௡ೞ೤೙೎,೔೘೛೗೔೎೔೟௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೟೚೟ೌ೗  
Ratio of number of implicit synchronization points 
to total number of procedure steps (a value of zero 
means no commands are sent). 
• ݇௖௥௜௧.௦௬௡௖ ൌ ௡ೞ೤೙೎,೟೚೟ೌ೗௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೎ೝ೔೟.  
Ratio of total number of synchronization points to 
procedure steps while in critical state (only 
applicable if	݊௦௧௘௣௦,௖௥௜௧. ൐ 0; cf. ݇௦௬௡௖). 
• ݇௖௥௜௧.௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧ ൌ ௡ೞ೤೙೎,೐ೣ೛೗೔೎೔೟௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೎ೝ೔೟.  
Ratio of number of explicit synchronization points 
to procedure steps while in critical state (only 
applicable if 	݊௦௧௘௣௦,௖௥௜௧. ൐ 0; cf.	݇௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧). 
• ݇௖௥௜௧.௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧ ൌ ௡ೞ೤೙೎,೔೘೛೗೔೎೔೟௡ೞ೟೐೛ೞ,೎ೝ೔೟.  
Ratio of number of implicit synchronization points 
to procedure steps while in critical state (only 
applicable if 	݊௦௧௘௣௦,௖௥௜௧. ൐ 0; cf.	݇௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧). 
 
Application to Columbus procedures 
The characteristics and factors are applied to 
example procedures that are used in the day-to-
day operations at Col‑CC. This means analyzing 
and understanding the steps of the procedures, 
annotating them with status information, i.e. adding 
annotations that indicate at which instructions a 
critical state is entered and later left again, as well 
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as decomposing the procedures, forming groups of 
logically related instructions. 
While characterizing procedures, several rules 
must be followed that derive from the dynamic 
nature of manned space operations. During real-
world operations, one major aspect concerning the 
execution of procedures is that the same 
procedure may be executed in a different way at 
different times. This may be due to a procedure 
being applicable to various distinct but mostly 
identical systems, or – more often than not – the 
execution depending on some system state and 
operational considerations. 
This includes situations where e.g. only part of a 
procedure is scheduled to be executed or a sub-
procedure is only called when a telemetry item is 
not in the expected value range. 
These rules to be applied during characterization 
of procedures are: 
1. Assume that every instruction that can be 
executed by both ground and crew is in fact 
executed by the ground (save crew work time). 
2. Always include all steps of a procedure, 
even if they may not be applicable in some 
situations. If a step contains an instruction to end 
the execution of the procedure at this point, ignore 
this instruction and proceed with the execution to 
the end of the procedure. 
3. For any conditional block, assume that the 
instructions within that block are part of the regular 
flow of instructions, i.e. any condition is assumed 
to be true. This does not apply to variants guarded 
by conditional blocks where only one condition can 
ever be true – in this case, count the block with the 
most read-write instruction combinations. As a 
general rule, always assume the worst case when 
scoring procedures. Exceptions to this general rule 
are conditional blocks with a repeat instruction, 
which may only be counted once.  
4. Whenever another procedure is called out 
in a step, the steps and sub-steps of this sub-
procedure must be considered as if they were part 
of the calling procedure. This rule does not apply 
to sub-procedures that effectively abort the 
procedure, e.g. contingency shutdowns of 
hardware due to certain error conditions. Likewise 
if a step in a sub-procedure contains an instruction 
to end the execution of the procedure at this point, 
ignore this instruction and only return to the calling 
procedure after the last step of the sub-procedure 
(cf. rule 2). 
To derive the procedure impact characteristics and 
factors the following steps are followed:  
1. Annotate the procedure with flags to 
indicate at which instruction a critical system state 
is entered and left again.  
2. Count the number of procedure steps and 
critical steps per the rules outlined above. 
3. List all executable instructions of the 
procedure regardless of their associated steps 
considering the rules described above. Form new 
groups of instructions that can be executed in 
sequence without requiring an intermediate round-
trip. 
4. Count and summarize the number of 
implicit and explicit synchronization points.  
5. Calculate the impact factors as defined 
above. 
As an example, these steps are applied to a type 
of procedure that is very common for Col‑CC 
operations: Activation of a rack, namely the HRF‑1 
rack of NASA, which, due to a barter agreement, is 
located inside Columbus – this combination 
renders the procedure a bit more complex than 
comparable ones for ESA-owned racks. The 
procedure is registered as «1.305 HRF1 ISPR 
RACK ACTIVATION» (version FIN 8).  
 
Calculation Results 
Results of using the impact quantification process 
described above are listed in Tab. 2. Results of 
procedures marked with an asterisk (*) only cover 
the procedure itself and do not include any sub-
procedures for simplicity; instead, every call-out to 
a sub-procedure is counted as one additional 
implicit synchronization point. 
Tab. 2: Impact factors of various procedures 
Procedure 1.305 9.102 2.101* 9.401* 9.414* 
݊௦௧௘௣௦,௧௢௧௔௟ 15 19 35 58 57 
݊௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧ 7 0 6 - - 
݊௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧ 9 16 29 105 54 
݊௦௬௡௖,௧௢௧௔௟ 16 16 35 105 54 
݇௦௬௡௖ 1.067 0.842 1 1.810 0.947 
݇௦௬௡௖,௘௫௣௟௜௖௜௧ 0.467 0 0.171 - - 
9 
݇௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧ 0.6 0.842 0.829 1.810 0.947 
For comparison, the table also includes results for 
further example procedures. The procedures were 
selected based on the following considerations:  
• 9.102 CHECKOUT OF BACK-UP WATER 
LOOP (WPA2): A simple but extensive ground-
only (i.e. cannot be performed by crew) 
procedure, which is executed weekly to ensure 
that a critical back-up system behaves 
nominally. 
• 2.101 TCS LOOP WPA1 TO WPA2 
SWITCHOVER – AUTO: A highly complex and 
potentially long-running procedure that 
concerns critical equipment. 
• 9.401 TCS LOOP WPA1 TO WPA2 
SWITCHOVER – MANUAL: Same as 2.101 
but with less on-board automation, i.e. more 
manual commanding by ground. 
• 9.414 WATER LOOP FDIR SWITCHOVER: 
Similar to 2.101 resp. 9.401 but manually 
initiating the failover procedure that is triggered 
by the autonomous on-board monitoring 
system in certain contingency situations. 
 
Analysis and Discussion of Operations 
Analysing the impact of the signal propagation time 
is a very complex and manifold topic. Even the 
simple characteristics and rules to quantify this 
impact on procedures as proposed can only hint to 
the real-world impact on operations as the highly 
dynamic nature and complex interactions of 
manned space operations are hard to limit to a 
restricted scope. Nonetheless, analysing a 
restricted aspect of these operations proofs to be 
useful and helps in painting the bigger picture. The 
scope chosen for this study limits the observations 
to the ground operations at Col‑CC and the 
execution of its procedures. 
ISS operations are heavily reliant on near-real-time 
and near-continuous communication between the 
space and ground segments. On the other hand, 
critical systems aboard the station are constantly 
monitored by on-board computers, which are able 
to react to a limited set of off-nominal situations 
and automatically recover critical functionality resp. 
switch to redundancies. But even then the 
operators on the ground will have to react to such 
contingencies quickly, as a safe mode of 
operations cannot be sustained for some hardware 
without further manual commanding. And while 
operations on-board the station will not come to an 
instant halt for longer and unexpected drop-outs in 
communication (e.g. one which is comparable to 
the longest round-trip times encountered during 
Mars missions), they will certainly switch to 
contingency mode sooner than later, i.e. disabling 
non-essential functionality. This is especially true 
when a sudden off-nominal behavior is detected 
and the ground is unable to investigate in a timely 
manner. 
Investigating and recovering from such 
contingency operations is an arduous and lengthy 
process, which the on-board crew is unable to 
conduct autonomously in most cases due to the 
limited interfaces available to the crew. 
Incidentally, the multi-national architecture of the 
space station – in combination with the experience 
of the ISS astronauts – provides enough 
redundancies for the main communications stack 
to soften the effect of a temporary data 
transmission outage. This is however not fully 
applicable to inter-planetary missions with 
considerable signal propagation times. 
It follows that the design for interplanetary 
spacecraft must allow for a significant increase in 
on-board autonomy. More specifically, the 
autonomous systems monitoring and control shall 
not only ensure the safety of crew and vehicle, but 
also the continuous operation in nominal mode as 
much as possible. The Data Management System 
of Columbus and its layered architecture provide a 
good stepping stone to achieve this autonomy.  
The crew interfaces available in Columbus are 
however insufficient as they do not provide nearly 
the same capabilities the ground has. For missions 
with a considerable OWLT, the trade-off made for 
the design of Columbus between usability and 
cognitive strain on the one hand side and 
extensive on-board autonomy and complexity on 
the other one is not acceptable. 
Current ISS operations focus on maximizing crew 
time for research and minimizing their time spent 
with maintaining and operating station equipment. 
The same principle is foreseeable for inter-
planetary missions, at least in their primary mission 
phase, during which all systems shall operate in 
nominal mode. Any failure to do so will incur major 
cost by keeping the crew from fulfilling their 
mission. All on-board systems must thus be highly 
reliable and well understood in order to minimize 
the time spent analyzing a fault and fixing the 
system. 
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Further essential knowledge for continuous 
nominal operations is the mutual influence of 
system components and hence the global system 
state, which has to be verified against the 
expected state especially during commanding. For 
Columbus systems, this is done manually by the 
flight controllers, who then need to actively 
reconfigure the automatic on-board monitoring 
systems during the execution of procedures. This 
currently used approach entails operational risk, as 
the system can only ensure the nominal and safe 
functionality for equipment it is currently tasked to 
monitor.  
Scenarios where system failures may remain 
undetected for too long have been mentioned 
above: E.g. during rack activation, there is a 
significant time gap, including a significant number 
of round-trips, between power activation and 
enabling of smoke detectors. Only the operator 
knows that the system moves to a critical state and 
that this state is only left when the appropriate 
monitoring is armed manually.  
For future missions with a high demand for system 
autonomy, the system shall know when a critical 
system state is entered and left again, so it can 
effectively monitor these important state 
transitions. To provide even more situational 
awareness to the on-board monitoring systems, it 
may be helpful to convey the intended final 
outcome of a string of commands at the beginning 
of a procedure, so the system can monitor the 
procedure execution itself. This applies to remotely 
controlled operations in particular, as the time gap 
between ground monitoring and sending 
commands increases with the OWLT. 
Another aspect of system reliability is complexity. 
While flight controllers work hard to minimize 
operational complexity of system procedures, it is 
not always possible to do so. Furthermore, there 
are no objective measures to identify the 
complexity of a procedure and track it during 
procedure development and revision. The 
procedure characteristics and impact factors 
proposed in this study may provide such metrics 
and aid in optimizing existing procedures.  
The optimization goal is to reduce the impact factor 
values as much as possible while not increasing 
the total number of steps, i.e. reducing the number 
of synchronization points. This can be achieved in 
numerous ways, e.g. by grouping sets of write-only 
instructions and thereby separating them from 
read-only instructions, which ultimately leads to 
less round-trips being made.  
Another way is to move some or all status checks 
into more complex on-board programs that also 
include the commands as specified in the 
procedure. The effect of such a measurement can 
be seen in the vastly improved impact factors 
(especially ݇௦௬௡௖,௜௠௣௟௜௖௜௧) of procedure 2.101 
compared to 9.401 as listed in Tab. 2, with the 
former providing more system autonomy. 
However, rewriting procedures to reduce impact 
factors may also result in an increased operational 
risk. This is especially true for the naïve approach 
of grouping all commands into one block and 
moving all post-command verification steps to the 
end of the procedure: “Blindingly” executing 
commands in an unknown system state may result 
in undefined behavior and is thus associated with 
higher risk than executing a series of combined 
command-verify steps one-by-one. This risk is not 
covered by the impact factors proposed herein. 
Rewriting procedures may also require 
modifications to on-board systems. At the very 
least, this means adding software facilities to 
automatically roll-back commands if certain status 
checks fail and provide the ground with detailed 
execution analysis. Some systems may even 
require major hardware modifications to be able to 
track system state by themselves and always 
operate in a safe configuration in between a group 
of multiple consecutive commands.  
The impact factors proposed in this study provide a 
basis for assessing different aspects of procedure 
quality. First and foremost, this is the OWLT-
dependence of procedures. The factors and 
characteristics are limited – nevertheless, their 
concept can easily be extended on and further 
measurements added.  
Their limitations are however not restricted to the 
number of measurements but also the rules that 
must be applied as described. It is very difficult to 
represent complex cases like multiple sub-
procedure end points (i.e. instructions in sub-
procedures to abort a procedure execution or jump 
back to the calling procedure) or dynamic 
procedure execution (e.g. limiting to a selection of 
procedure steps). Especially difficult to represent 
are procedures that rely on procedure or 
environmental parameters that change the way of 
the instruction flow, e.g. procedures that skip over 
steps depending on the result of a command 
execution. 
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The characterization steps and rules are 
intentionally simplistic so they can easily be 
implemented in software and thus allow automatic 
characterization of procedures. This may enable 
procedure maintainers to automatically track 
changes in quality whenever procedures are 
updated without incurring procedural overhead in 
the change workflow. Additionally, automating the 
scoring of procedures allows relaxing some of the 
characterization rules, e.g. by adapting the impact 
factors dynamically depending on the system state 
and planned activity. 
Conclusion 
In the last two years Col-CC proved that it could 
handle a number of high activity phases in a row 
with 4 ESA astronauts on ISS in a short timeframe. 
This phase was also used to install new 
challenging payloads on-board Columbus such as 
PK-4 and EML and to take over new tasks outside 
the Columbus module (see [14]). In addition to the 
on-board activities, updates in the ground facilities 
like server virtualization and transition to the new 
NASA planning software was supported and 
implemented, respectively. 
Despite some initial difficulties to fulfil all 
requirements and the need of some adaptation to 
the timeline and restriction to operations, almost all 
objectives of the increments could be achieved 
and both increments were successfully performed. 
Furthermore, Col-CC is looking into the future and 
is preparing itself for possible future endeavours. In 
the study, the current setup of low-latency 
operations was applied to case studies of deep 
space missions with significant delays in 
communications. 
Currently, the Columbus systems architecture, its 
operations concept, and the procedures indicate a 
substantial reliance on real-time operations, which 
is not surprising given the ISS mission design. 
However, Columbus does include some autonomy 
features to increase independence from ground: 
The module is trying to react to system failures in 
the most graceful way possible. In case of failure of 
switching to a safe state, ultimately immediate 
crew evacuation from the module is required – 
which may not be an option in future long-distance 
space missions. 
This study introduces a simple method to quantify 
the impact of the OWLT on the execution of 
procedures. Measuring the characteristics of 
procedures commonly used in human spaceflight 
by the ground as proposed herein enables 
operators to easily determine if these procedures 
are suitable for potential future mission with a 
significant communications delay. Furthermore, the 
same characteristics permit procedure authors and 
maintainers to reliantly track the effect changes to 
procedures have on their delay tolerance. 
Additionally, the findings are also applicable to 
today’s low-latency ISS operations. The 
characteristics described, which are not measured 
today, allow Col‑CC to quantify some key aspects 
of complexity in procedures.  
Especially with further procedure annotations, this 
may lead to interesting applications in the near 
future, both for manual and automated 
quantification: E.g. procedure maintainers can 
track procedure complexity (including no. of steps 
between entering and exiting critical system states) 
and try to reduce it; planners may be notified about 
high complexity of newly introduced procedures 
and allocate a more suitable time slot for their 
execution (for automated quantification: auto-
optimize time slot based on subset of steps in 
execution notes); and operators may be better 
informed about system state or even assisted in 
choosing responses to system behavior 
(annotations allow operator or state machine to 
easily track critical system state).  
In summary, these findings might help quantifying 
and reducing the operations risk at Col‑CC. 
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